FIRST AMENDMENT ORIGINALISM:
THE ORIGINAL LAW AND A THEORY OF LEGAL
CHANGE AS APPLIED TO THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND OF THE PRESS
Adam Griffin
ABSTRACT
Modern First Amendment law on the freedom of speech and
press is, in an important way, originalist. This claim runs contrary to the perception of many. This Article explains the
originalist pedigree of the First Amendment. The original meaning of the First Amendment in 1791, standing alone, does not
protect as much expression as the modern Supreme Court’s jurisprudence says it does. The Constitution’s structure, however,
protects liberty. The original legal meaning of the First Amendment, taken in conjunction with the original understanding of
the enumerated powers scheme of Article I, Section 8, the rights
protecting rule of construction in the Ninth Amendment, and the
reservation of powers to the States in the Tenth Amendment,
protects a greater sphere of speech and press than does the First
Amendment alone. It may protect all of it, from the federal government at least. This was the Jeffersonian argument in opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798, that the First Amendment
barred all federal government regulation of speech and press.
That argument became the law of the First Amendment through
the theory of liquidation. Liquidation is a theory for how ambiguous constitutional meaning can be fixed or settled to a more refined meaning. Through liquidation, the original meanings of the
Constitution’s multi-faceted structural protections for speech and
press liberties was condensed entirely into the confines of the
First Amendment. The Jeffersonian construction of the First
Amendment that emerged from this contest over the Amendment’s meaning, was importantly connected to the original
meaning of the Constitution and its First Amendment. It is also
the foundation for the Supreme Court’s modern First
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Amendment jurisprudence. This pedigree of the First Amendment makes it originalist in an important way.
This Article walks readers through this historical process of legal
change in the original meaning of the First Amendment.
Originalism does not prevent legal change. It requires that law
be changed in accordance with the law. This Article does not arrive at the final word on the meaning of the First Amendment. It
does not claim to argue what the correct interpretation of the
First Amendment is or what its meaning should be. Yet, it does
argue that in an important way our First Amendment law is
originalist. That fact is of importance for our understanding of
the First Amendment’s meaning and its correct application to
concrete legal problems.
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INTRODUCTION
James Madison wrote that the First Amendment “is a
denial to Congress of all power over the press[.]”1 But was the
“Father of the Constitution” right? Weighed against
Ratification-era sources, Madison’s interpretation of the First
Amendment was a novel invention2 and not part of the First
Amendment’s original meaning.3 Yet, Madison’s succinct
articulation of the Jeffersonian interpretation of the First
Amendment became the law of the United States4 and is still
considered the foundation of modern First Amendment
jurisprudence by the Supreme Court.5 If the Jeffersonian
interpretation is incorrect, it should follow that a great deal of
First Amendment case law is consequently incorrect.6 I argue
that the original legal meaning of the First Amendment, properly
situated in the constitutional superstructure, may not require the
overturning of many seminal First Amendment cases, even if
those cases could have been decided with a firmer grounding in
originalism. Further, I argue that through a theory known as
liquidation, the fixing of ambiguous constitutional meaning, the
Jeffersonian interpretation of the First Amendment may be the
original law of the First Amendment.
This Article attempts to define and explain a theory of
“Original Law Originalism” as applied to the First Amendment.
It begins by first restating the original meaning of the First

1

JAMES MADISON, Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADI(David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991).
2
Jud Campbell, The Invention of First Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Campbell, First Amendment Federalism].
3
Id. at 21.
4
Id. at 5.
5
See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (explaining
Madison’s interpretation of the First Amendment in the context of his opposition to
the Sedition Act, a view that “has carried the day in the court of history”).
6
Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 263–64
(2017) [hereinafter Campbell, Natural Rights] (“A huge swath of modern case law, after all, falls outside of the First Amendment’s original legal ambit, including its ban
on prior restraints and its protection for well-intentioned statements of one’s
thoughts. If an originalist wanted First Amendment doctrine to track Founding Era
judicial reasoning, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Texas v. Johnson, Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, Citizens United v. FEC, and Snyder v. Phelps, among many, many others, would likely have to go.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, What If the Founders Had Free
Speech Wrong? A Scholar’s Jarring Claim: America’s Framers Meant to Protect a Lot Less
Speech than Most of Us Think, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-14/what-if-the-u-s-has-freespeech-all-wrong (“Campbell’s research raises serious questions for ‘originalists’ . . .
.”). But see Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 264 (“[O]ther originalists argue
that judges are empowered, or even duty-bound, to give concrete meaning to underdeterminate constitutional provisions. If one accepts this view, then modern law
might still comport with original meaning.”).
SON 336

94

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Amendment (Campbell’s view) then explaining how that
original meaning was “changed” or “liquidated” by the
Jeffersonians. It connects the legal history of the First
Amendment to its modern legal meaning to demonstrate that, by
its pedigree, our modern First Amendment law is originalist.7
Original Law Originalism is a theory of originalism and of legal
change. It is “a particular way to understand where our law
comes from, what it requires, and how it can be changed.” 8 The
theory rests on the principle that law has a meaning at the time
it is adopted and that that meaning can change. It can only
change, however, if it is legally changed by the proper method
authorized by the law for making that legal change. The
proposition is that “our law”—that is, American law—“happens
to consist of their law, the Founders’ law, including lawful
changes made along the way.”9 Consequently, to understand
what our law is today, we must understand the content of the
Founder’s law and then, if it was changed, how it was changed.
This Article applies that Original Law Originalism definition of
our law’s legal content to the First Amendment to explain the
current foundation of First Amendment jurisprudence and to
provide a means for discovering the Amendment’s true legal
meaning.
The natural place to begin our inquiry is the text of the
First Amendment and its legal content at the time of enactment
in 1791. The “freedom of speech, or of the press”10 in the law of
the First Amendment has two distinct meanings; and the
meaning of those legal words proceeds from two sources. One
springs from the Framers’ conception of the natural rights of
speaking, writing, and publishing.11 The other is a fundamental
positive right, the liberty of the press, derived from the common
law, which carries with it certain established customary legal
rules about what government can and cannot do in regards to
regulating the press.12 What the legal content of the First
Amendment consists of is its original meaning. Professor
Campbell defines that original meaning as “the First
Amendment recognized (either implicitly or outright) the
ordinary natural right of expressive freedom along with (either

7

This Article heavily relies upon Professor Campbell’s recently published article Natural Rights and the First Amendment for understanding the First Amendment’s original
meaning. See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6.
8
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 817, 818 (2015).
9
Id. (emphasis omitted).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11
See infra Section I.D.
12
See id.
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absolute or presumptive) protection for a set of customary rules
with more determinate legal meanings.”13
This Article agrees with Campbell’s original
understanding of the First Amendment; however, I argue that
there is more to it. The meaning of the First Amendment is
decidedly shaped by its relationship to governmental power and
historical practices. Both the Federalist and later Republican
view (that developed out of the Anti-Federalist view)14 share that
the First Amendment’s interactions with the exercise of
governmental power help define its protective content.15 Each
camp’s distinct views of how the First Amendment applies to
resolve concrete cases hinges as much on different conceptions
of federalism and governmental power, at the state and federal
level, as they do on the meaning of the text of the Amendment
itself. Therefore, the ultimate question of how the Constitution
protects freedom of speech and press is resolved by practices and
events in Founding-Era history.
Finally, this Article will conclude with a discussion of
how the law of the First Amendment can be changed, or more
accurately, how a more settled meaning can crystalize out of a
range of plausible original meanings. Though there may be other
original methods of authorized legal change available, this
Article purports to apply a theory of liquidation that explains
how ambiguous constitutional meanings can be resolved
through historical practices.16 Liquidation theory is the idea that
the meaning of an ambiguous provision in the Constitution can
be settled by a course of historical practice that consistently
employs a certain meaning of the provision.17 The historical
course of practice settles or liquidates the meaning of that
provision as the meaning that is used in practice.18 Liquidation
theory is often employed in constitutional interpretation and
construction to determine a provision’s meaning, sometimes
under the modality of historical practices, but the Founding-Era
version is known as liquidation and has some definitive and
distinguishing components.19

13

Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 308.
See generally LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A
PARTY IDEOLOGY 92–125 (1978).
15
Federalists argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary because of the Constitution’s limited grant of enumerated powers and Republicans argued that rights provisions, i.e. the First Amendment, categorically bar the exercise of certain governmental powers.
16
See generally William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Baude, Constitutional Liquidation].
17
Id.
18
Id. at 3–4.
19
Id. at 1–4.
14
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In the context of First Amendment Originalism, this
Article will look to the arguments made by Federalists and
Republicans over the meaning of the First Amendment during
debates over the Sedition Act of 1798.20 This investigation into
legal history will analyze if the Federalist or Republican position
has the better understanding of the original meaning of the First
Amendment. Then this Article will look to the Republican
victory vindicating the principles of ’98 in the Election of 1800
and ask if that election and subsequent historical practices settled
or liquidated the Republican interpretation of the First
Amendment. In the alternative, the settlement of the First
Amendment’s legal meaning that occurred after the election of
Thomas Jefferson to the Presidency might have been an
unauthorized legal change in the First Amendment’s original
meaning.21As part of that legal change analysis, this Article will
ask if the change in meaning of the First Amendment brought
about by the Jeffersonian Republicans was an authorized or
unauthorized change in legal meaning and how that
determination is affected by the interpretation of governmental
power granted in Article I, Section 8.
In sum, this Article will analyze what the state of the law
relating to speech and press was at the time of the First
Amendment’s enactment; how the First Amendment’s
enactment as written law changed the state of the law at that
point, i.e. what the original law of the First Amendment is; and
if the Jeffersonian-Republican interpretation of the meaning and
effect of the First Amendment’s textual enactment was
consistent with the Original Law Original Meaning of the First
Amendment.22 Regardless of whether one is persuaded that the
liquidation of the First Amendment’s meaning on the
Jeffersonian construction in the aftermath of the Sedition Act
controversy of 1798 was a valid or invalid use of that legal
concept, a more concrete meaning of the Amendment emerged
from that historical contest and it established an originalist
pedigree in our current First Amendment law.

20

See WENDELL BIRD, PRESS AND SPEECH UNDER ASSAULT: THE EARLY SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES, THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798, AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DISSENT
256–58 (2016).
21
See BANNING, supra note 14, at 246–70 (defining the “Principles of Ninety-Eight” as
the principles that the Republicans espoused in their opposition to the Federalist passage, support for, and execution of the Sedition Act that led to the Jeffersonian electoral victory in 1800).
22
The Fourteenth Amendment also legally changes the meaning of the First Amendment and/or its relationship vis-a-vis state and federal power but that is beyond the
scope of this paper, which seeks to define only the original meaning of the First
Amendment to its Framers.
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This Article explains the originalist pedigree of First
Amendment law. This Article applies a theory of originalism
(Original Law Originalism) to the First Amendment and
explains how the meaning of the First Amendment was fixed or
liquidated in the Jeffersonian “Revolution of 1800” and from this
liquidation explains how through these moments of creation and
liquidation our First Amendment law is originalist. Part I begins
with an exploration of the intellectual and legal world in which
the Framers created the First Amendment to give the reader an
original understanding of the water that the First Amendment is
swimming in and to provide a language for original law rights
discussion. Part II explores an ambiguity in the original meaning
of the First Amendment in the context of its place within the
legal structure of the Constitution. The question presented here
is: regardless of the First Amendment, did the federal
government have constitutional authority to regulate speech and
press at all in 1789 (before the First Amendment was ratified).
This part of the Article pays particular attention to the interaction
between notions of power and of liberty in the Constitution, from
the Federalist and Anti-Federalist perspectives, pre-ratification
of the Bill of Rights and post-ratification, accounting for
significant historical practices that shaped the meaning of
constitutional provisions in the 1790’s. Part III then explains the
originalist roots of modern First Amendment law. It explains
how the meaning of the First Amendment was liquidated by the
historical practices of the Jeffersonian opposition to the Sedition
Act. It further explains how liquidation could validly occur in
this situation because the Jeffersonian legal view is connected to
the Anti-Federalist conception of power, liberty, and
constitutional purpose—views that were present during
Ratification. This Article concludes that in an important way,
our First Amendment law is originalist.
I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT’S ORIGINAL MEANING: SOCIAL CONTRACT
THEORY AND NATURAL RIGHTS PHILOSOPHY
The Framers of the United States Constitution, the
founding generation, and ratifying public, understood their
constitutional rights in the context of the interplay between social
contract theory and natural rights philosophy. It is important for
understanding the meaning of the First Amendment to
understand the legal and intellectual world into which it was
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drafted and enacted.23 Social contract theory was the founding
generation’s way of understanding how society and governments
were formed by intellectually analyzing hypothetical stages of
political development.24 This theory—derived from a kind of
thought experiment—was the foundation of Founding-Era
constitutionalism and rights discourse.25 This Section of the
Article will first lay out the Framers’ concept of the “state of
nature.” Then follows an explanation of the social contract
theory, of which the state of nature is a part, and its connection
to the Constitution. The next step is to explain how FoundingEra rights discourse emerged from this state of nature/social
contract theory framework. The section concludes by inserting
the First Amendment into that intellectual and legal framework
to arrive at the original meaning of the First Amendment. It is
this meaning of the First Amendment that Original Law
Originalism and liquidation theory acted on during the decade
following ratification.
The State of Nature
The first stage in the development of a political society
under social contract theory was the state of nature.26 In the
context of Original Law Originalism, this is the framework that
holds the roots of the First Amendment’s legal content.27 The
state of nature—like social contract theory itself—is something
of a legal fiction, an abstract hypothetical.28 In the state of nature,

23

See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (50th Anniversary ed. 2017) (explaining the intellectual world of the
Founders); see also GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776–1787 (1998).
24
See Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85, 87 (2017) [hereinafter Campbell, Republicanism] (“Social-contract theory . .
. underpinned most of Founding-Era constitutionalism . . . .”).
25
See, e.g., Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 252 n.13; JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 276–77 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)
(1690) (“For ‘tis not every Compact that puts an end to the State of Nature between
Men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one Community,
and make one Body Politick . . . .”); JAMES MADISON, Essay on Sovereignty, in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 568, 570 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (1835).
26
See, e.g., Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at 87 (2017) (explaining that the
state of nature was “imagining what things would be like without a government”);
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Farmer Refuted (1775), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 86 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961).
27
Sachs, supra note 8, at 818 (explaining that Original Law Originalism is a “particular way to understand where our law comes from, what it requires, and how it can be
changed.”) (emphasis added).
28
See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 87; John P. Reid, Law and History, 27
LOY L.A. L. REV. 193, 213 (1993) (“The social contract was a legal fiction explaining
the stipulations under which individuals left the state of nature and created societies.”); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 14 (John B. Windham ed., 1795) (“I doubt whether a state of nature ever did, or

2019]

FIRST AMENDMENT ORIGINALISM

99

there is no government, people possess their natural liberty in
full, and thus they possess all of their natural rights.29 Natural
rights were considered easily identifiable because they were “selfevident”—encompassing all the liberties that people could
exercise in the absence of government or governmental action.30
In other words, natural rights were those things people could do
in a state of nature.31 Such things as walking, talking, hunting,
and praying were seen as natural rights.32
Natural laws circumscribed natural rights. Natural laws
were seen as governing human nature, like gravity governed
nature itself, and it was believed that humans could naturally
discern these laws.33 Natural law and the interaction of one
person’s natural liberty with another’s were the only theoretical
limitations on the exercise of humans’ natural rights in a state of
nature.34 Thus, natural law and natural rights, in some sense,
defined the parameters of the state of nature.
The Declaration of Independence recognized the state of
nature. That upon the separation of the American colonies from
Great Britain, the people had “assume[d] among the powers of
the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of
Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them.”35 This was an express
recognition that the state of humans without government is the
state of nature. The separation from Great Britain had brought

can exist; but I can imagine such a state, and thence infer the advantages derived
from a union in society.”).
29
Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at 88; THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 64
(Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1651) (“The Right of Nature . . . is the Liberty each man
hath, to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own Nature;
that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own
Judgement and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”); Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac H. Tiffany (Apr. 4, 1819) in 14 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES, Feb.–Aug. 1819, 201–02 (J. Jefferson
Looney ed., 2017).
30
SWIFT, supra note 28, at 176 (“Natural rights consist in our possessing and enjoying
the power, and privilege of doing whatever we think proper, without any other restraint than what results from the laws of nature.”).
31
In the “intellectual world commonly known as ‘the Founding[,]’” natural rights
meant something different than the modern understanding. Natural rights were not
concrete trumps on governmental action nor determinate legal privileges and immunities. Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at 86. “Rather, embracing natural
rights meant embracing a mode of reasoning” with the purpose of creating and serving
the best form of republican representative government. Id. (emphasis in the original).
32
Id. at 91.
33
See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 3 (“Antecedent to [positive] laws are
those of nature; so called because they derive their force entirely from our frame and
existence.”).
34
JAMES WILSON, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 1056 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark D. Hall eds., 2007) (“In a state of natural liberty, every one is allowed to act according to his own inclination, provided he
transgress not those limits, which are assigned to him by the law of nature.”).
35
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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about a state of nature among the national polity by dissolving
the colonies’ social contract with England.36
The Social Contract and the Constitution
Realizing that the state of nature was insufficient to
safeguard their natural rights, people entered into a social
contract.37 A social contract predated the formation of a
government and was “an agreement among isolated individuals
in a state of nature to combine in a society.”38 The social contract
was something to which all the people had to consent, because
the individual was viewed as the “original sovereign.”39 By
nothing but the universal consent of all individual sovereigns, so
the theory went, could the people be bound by the social
contract.40 With the creation of a social contract, individuals
formed the body politic,41 which was the new sovereign, united
in the pursuit of their common good and individual happiness.42
The body politic as the sovereign governed through majority
rule.43
The next step was for the body politic to create and adopt
a form of government, to organize and govern the society formed
by the social contract. The preamble to the United States
Constitution recognized that the American body politic, by
whom and for whom the Constitution was formed, was already
in existence before the Constitution was written. That preexistent body politic is acknowledged as “We the People.”44 This

36

Id.
See Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at 88.
38
WOOD, supra note 23, at 283.
39
Chisholm, Ex’r. v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 456 (1793) (Wilson, J., concurring) (explaining the concept of the individual as the original sovereign for purposes of social
contract theory).
40
See Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at 89; see also RANDY BARNETT, OUR
REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE
PEOPLE 74–76 (2016) (describing the Founders’ view of supposed or implicit consent).
41
See Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at 88; MASS. CONST. OF 1780 pmbl.
(“The body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals: It is a social
compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen
with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common
good.”).
42
LOCKE, supra note 25, at 330–31 (“The only way whereby any one divests himself
of his Natural Liberty, and puts the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men
to joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living
one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against any that are not of it.”) (emphasis in the original).
43
Id. at 331 (“When any number of men have so consented to make one community or
Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body Politick,
wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest.”) (emphasis in original).
44
U.S. CONST. pmbl ; see also Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1,
1787) (remarks of William Findley), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
37
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theory of societal and governmental formation forms the legal
backbone for the constitutional structure into which the First
Amendment was inserted. In that respect, these underlying
philosophies of government are an intellectual and legal history
of the original meaning for the First Amendment.
The Declaration of Independence goes on to explain that
governments derive “their just powers from the consent of the
governed,” (the body politic) and further that “Governments are
instituted” to “secure . . . rights” including “Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness.”45 So if the purpose of government
formed out of these hypothetical stages of political development
is centrally to protect natural rights, or, as the Declaration refers
to them, “unalienable Rights,” then what are these rights? Under
the broad umbrella of social contract theory there exists a
taxonomy of rights that is rooted in and descends from natural
rights philosophy. It was this taxonomy that the Founders
understood, and that shaped their discourse about rights,
including speech and press rights.
Founding-Era Rights Talk
Descending from natural rights philosophy and stemming
from the common law tradition, the Founders understood rights
in a particular way. They were well versed in this taxonomy of
rights and their conception of it informed how they talked and
wrote about rights, including those codified in the First
Amendment. This taxonomy first broke down into two camps,
rights that are retained portions of human beings’ natural liberty
and positive rights that are granted by the government.46 This
taxonomy included several categories of rights: inalienable
natural rights, natural rights generally, retained natural rights,

THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

447–48 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (“In the
Preamble, it is said, ‘We the People,’ and not ‘We the States,’ which therefore is a
compact between individuals entering into society, and not between separate states
enjoying independent power and delegating a portion of that power for their common benefit.”).
45
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
46
The distinction between natural rights and positive rights is important in the context of freedom of speech and freedom of the press because the Founders saw speech
as one of the rights of which effective government “do[es] not require a surrender[,]”
and that might be encroached upon if surrendered, whereas freedom of the press is
protected because it is among those “certain fences which experience has proved peculiarly efficacious against wrong, and rarely obstructive of right, which yet the governing powers have ever shewn a disposition to weaken and remove.” See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 1790), in Founders Online, NATIONAL ARCHIVES (last modified June 13, 2018), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-18-02-0091; see also Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at
90–91.
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fundamental positive rights, and ordinary positive rights.47
Founding-Era natural rights philosophy, consistent with social
contract theory, understood the existence of rights to predate
society, and viewed them as inherent in the nature of humans,
existing in the state of nature, or developing out of experience.48
As Randy Barnett succinctly put it, “first come rights and then
comes government.”49
Natural rights were liberties which people could readily
exercise independent of the existence of government.50 Thus
speaking, writing, and publishing were clearly identified as
natural rights.51 These natural rights, by and large, could be
regulated by representative government pursuant to the common
good—the object for which society and constitutions are
formed.52 Under this conception, far more regulations of First
Amendment “natural rights” would be permissible under the
original meaning of the First Amendment (the CampbellFederalist view53) if the representatives decided such regulations
promoted the public good. 54
A subset of natural rights is “inalienable natural rights.”
The Founders used this terminology to describe two sets of

47

Federal Farmer No. 6 (Dec. 25, 1787), in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 979, 983–84 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds.,
2004) (describing different types of rights, Madison said “[o]f rights, some are natural
and unalienable, of which even the people cannot deprive individuals: Some are constitutional or fundamental; these cannot be altered or abolished by the ordinary laws;
. . . and some are common or mere legal rights, that is, such as individuals claim under laws which the ordinary legislature may alter or abolish at pleasure.”); see also
James Madison, Remarks (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 64, 81 (Helen E. Veit
et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING].
48
Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at 90–91.
49
BARNETT, supra note 40, at 44.
50
Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 252 (listing Founding-Era sources defining natural rights).
51
Id. (listing Founding-Era sources that defined the natural rights of speaking, writing
and publishing).
52
Barnett and others make a counter or parallel claim that the object of society and
of constitutions is to protect natural rights, though it very well may be that the common good and protection of natural rights were one in the same in the Founders’
conception. See BARNETT, supra note 40, at 44.
53
This view of the First Amendment has a great deal of parity with the BlackstoneMansfield view of freedom of speech and of the press. See generally LEONARD W.
LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 191 (1985) (providing the Blackstonian definition of freedom of the press); see also Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 263–64
(explaining the “original legal ambit” of the First Amendment, the “Campbell-Federalist view”).
54
Statutes in the Founding Era contained preambles that stated the purpose of the
statute and many believed the Constitution would be interpreted in common law
fashion as a kind of “super-statute” and thus the purpose laid down in the preamble,
including promotion of the public good, was relevant to interpretation and construction of the document. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 908 (1985).
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natural rights. Sometimes they referred to rights that were
considered so fundamentally endowed in human nature that a
person could not give them up, even willingly; and this was
because individuals lacked control over them. This included the
right of conscience or having thoughts, something seen as nonvolitional.55 The other way the Founders used the phrase
“inalienable natural rights” was to refer to rights retained by the
people that could be given up only by consent. However, under
their theory of republican government—a body politic that
governed through majority rule—legislative representation could
give consent.56
Retained natural rights, a further subset of inalienable
natural rights, on the other hand, consisted of that portion of
natural liberty that the people reserved for themselves in the
terms of the social contract or constitution57—some argued that
all of natural liberty was retained58 and others argued only a
limited sphere of natural liberty was retained within the bounds
of established legal rules.59 Regardless, natural rights generally
could only be restricted in the interest of the public good.
Consequently, representative government determined the scope
of retained natural liberty by legislating (in theory) in accordance
with the common good.60 In this way the people’s liberties were
tied to the public good through representative government—
designed to encourage good government and promote the public
happiness.61
55

Interestingly, Madison and Jefferson considered Freedom of Religion as a Freedom of Conscience in the realm of inalienable rights. See James Madison, Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 29–36 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Library of America 1999); see also
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (June 18, 1779), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 346–48 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Library of America
1984).
56
Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at 97.
57
Federal Farmer No. 2 (Oct. 9, 1787), reprinted in 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 214, 216, (John P. Kaminski et al. eds.,
2003) (“There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming the
social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed . . . . ”).
58
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis W. Gilmer (June 7, 1816), in 15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 23, 24 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds.,
1905) (“[T]he idea is quite unfounded, that on entering into society we give up any
natural right.”).
59
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121–22 (“Political, therefore, or civil
liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general
advantage of the publick.”).
60
Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at 93–96.
61
Madison makes a similar move in The Federalist, arguing that individual rights
should be tied to representative republican government thereby the individual’s natural liberty would be tied to the common good so that in defending their natural liberty they will in turn be defending the common good. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison) (“The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be
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Positive rights, by contrast,62 were legally defined
privileges and immunities that were cast in terms of government
action or inaction and included rights such as habeas corpus and
trial by jury.63 These positive rights developed over time from
experience and adjudications primarily contained in the
principles, precepts, and precedents of the common law. Some
were deemed fundamental or essential and often overlapped
with the people’s natural rights, while others were simply
statutory rights.64 A positive right became fundamental by
widespread consensus and acceptance of the inviolability of the
right, or, in America, by enumeration.65 Given the way in which
many positive rights protected natural rights, there was a
perceived harmony between natural rights and the common law;
the former was the source of liberty, and the latter defined its
legally protected contours and ensured that the liberty was
safeguarded. 66
The First Amendment’s Place in this Framework
Social contract theory and natural rights philosophy
served as a framework for early discussions about the rights—
natural and positive—contained in the First Amendment. The
Amendment’s original meaning cannot be understood without
first understanding its philosophical, intellectual, and legal
context. Founding-Era constitutional interpretation often began
with principles derived from social contract theory framework of
how political society developed. As stated in the introduction,
Professor Campbell, through an extensive dive into this
framework67 and the place of the First Amendment within it,
developed an understanding of the original meaning of the First
Amendment: “[T]he First Amendment recognized (either

made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of
the place.”).
62
THOMAS PAINE, Candid and Critical Remarks on a Letter Signed Ludlow (June 4,
1777), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 274 (Philip S.
Foner ed., Citadel Press 1945) (explaining the difference between natural and positive rights by stating that “[a] natural right is an animal right; and the power to act it,
is supposed, either fully or in part, to be mechanically contained within ourselves as
individuals. Civil rights are derived from the assistance or agency of other persons;
they form a sort of common stock, which, by the consent of all, may be occasionally
used for the benefit of any.”).
63
Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 253 (listing Founding-Era sources defining positive rights).
64
Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 24, at 99.
65
See id. (discussing how confrontation became a fundamental positive right in the
late sixteenth century and the prohibition on press licensing in the seventeenth).
66
Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 291; see also R. H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL
LAW IN COURT: A HISTORY OF LEGAL THEORY IN PRACTICE 97–98 (2015).
67
See supra Sections I.A–C.
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implicitly or outright) the ordinary natural right of expressive
freedom along with (either absolute or presumptive) protection
for a set of customary rules with more determinate legal
meanings.”68 The former recognized an inalienable natural right
to the “freedom to make well-intentioned statements of one’s
thoughts” that was not subject to government control69 and then
also recognized the natural rights of speaking, writing, and
publishing that could be regulated by government in the interest
of the public good.70 The latter recognized the common law
positive right “liberty of the press,” which required a ban on prior
restraints.71 In America, an additional defense of truth
developed, the Zenger defense, and was recognized in many
jurisdictions.72 However, all of the content of this common law
positive right was additionally protected by the jury trial, which
was the only means of obtaining a conviction for laws
prosecuting alleged abuses of the press freedom. 73 This dual
meaning—the one grounded in natural rights and the other in
common law legal rights (positive rights)—is key to
understanding the First Amendment’s relation to governmental
power and the debates over its meaning between Federalists and
Republicans.
Campbell’s definition of the First Amendment’s original
meaning represents a unified original understanding of the
Amendment itself, one that most of the public at the time of its
ratification understood the Amendment to mean. But I argue
that the original understanding of speech and press freedoms at
the federal level may have more bite if fully situated within the
superstructure of the Constitution.74 Campbell himself
acknowledges that there is more to the First Amendment’s

68

Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 308.
Id. at 283.
70
Id. at 276.
71
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151 (“The liberty of the press is indeed
essential to the nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.”).
72
See Andrew Hamilton Defends Zenger, in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO
JEFFERSON 43, 54 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966) (“I beg Leave to insist, That the
Right of complaining or remonstrating is natural; And the Restraint upon this natural Right is the Law only, and that those Restraints can only extend to what is false . .
. .”).
73
Campbell, First Amendment Federalism, supra note 2, at 16 (“Commentators during
the ratification debates explicitly linked jury rights to concerns about governmental
suppression of dissent.”).
74
By superstructure of the Constitution I mean taking the Constitution as a whole—
situating the First Amendment in the whole constitutional text that includes limits on
power in Article I, Section 8, unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment, and reserved powers in the Tenth Amendment.
69
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original meaning than his consensus definition,75 but that its
scope is to be determined by representative republican
government.76 The debates over liberty and power that pervade
the early national period in American history initiated a process
of constitutional theory known as liquidation77 that serves to
further clarify and determine the First Amendment’s meaning
and connect our modern doctrine to the original understanding.
II. POWER, LIBERTY, AND AMBIGUITY
Before the First Amendment was adopted, the debates
over the ratification of the Constitution reveal an ambiguity in
the understanding of governmental power over the freedom of
the press.78 A single argument was made repeatedly by the
Federalists against the Anti-Federalists’ fierce insistence that a
Bill of Rights be added to the new federal Constitution in the
context of speech and press freedoms. That argument was that
protection for the freedom of the press was not necessary
because, as Charles Cotesworth Pinckney declared in the South
Carolina Ratifying Convention, “[t]he general government has
no powers but what are expressly granted to it; it therefore has
no power to take away the liberty of the press.”79 Pinckney was
expressing a common Federalist position.80 Hamilton, in
Federalist No. 84, further explained the position. He wrote that
a provision for protecting the liberty of the press was not only
unnecessary but dangerous. He asked: “Why, for instance,
should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be
imposed? . . . I will not contend that such a provision would
confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish,
to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that
power.”81 Perhaps, Hamilton recognized the limited legal
content of a speech and press provision like the First

75

Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 246 (“Founding-Era elites shared certain
understandings of speech and press freedoms, as concepts, even when they divided
over how to apply those concepts.”).
76
Id. at 259, 321.
77
See Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, supra note 16, at 1.
78
This ambiguity will be important for the application of liquidation theory to the
First Amendment.
79
DEBATES IN THE LEGISLATURE AND IN CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jan. 18, 1788) (statement of Charles Cotesworth Pickney), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, 253, 315 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES].
80
Id.
81
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Amendment. The danger in codifying, in writing, the legal
content inherent in an amendment protecting speech and press
was that it would be less protective of those general rights than
enumerating powers and leaving rights unenumerated. Given
that enumerating the rights of speech and press might imply that
the government had power over speech and press generally,
other than the limited protective legal content of the
Amendment’s text. The Federalists argued that the enumerated
powers of the new government did not contain a power over the
press, and this would operate as a greater protection for the rights
by denying power over them. In a sense, silence would speak
louder than words.
The Federalists argued that the liberty of the press was
protected by the original Constitution, even before a Bill of
Rights expressly protecting that liberty was added.82 They argued
that the right was protected by the limitations on power inherent
in the Article I, Section 8 enumeration.83 Some even referred to
that enumeration as a “Bill of Powers” and that which was not
granted was reserved.84 But what was meant by the “liberty of
the press” in these arguments? Did they intend “no power over
the press” to mean no power over a distinct set of common law
positive rights protections, such as no prior restraints on
publications in the press, but legislative power over all other
natural rights pursuant to the public good?85 Or when the
Federalists argued that there is no power over the press
enumerated in the Constitution, did they mean that the federal
government is deprived of all power over the press, ordinary or
extraordinary?86 There is some ambiguity here.87
82

James Madison, Debates in the House of Representatives (June 10, 1789), in CREsupra note 47, at 66–67.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 82 (“It has been said that in the federal government they [a bill of rights] are
unnecessary, because the powers are enumerated, and it follows that all that are not
granted by the constitution are retained: that the constitution is a bill of powers, the great
residuum being the rights of the people; and therefore a bill of rights cannot be so
necessary as if the residuum was thrown into the hands of the government. I admit
that these arguments are not entirely without foundation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
85
BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at *151.
86
MADISON, supra note 1, at 340 (“[I]t would seem scarcely possible to doubt, that no
power whatever over the press, was supposed to be delegated by the constitution, as
it originally stood; and that the amendment was intended as a positive and absolute
reservation of it.”).
87
James Iredell best captures this ambiguity by straddling both sides of the debate at
different times in his career. During the Ratification debates, Iredell went as far as to
argue that Congress could not create any new crimes not listed in the enumerated
powers of Congress. See James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New
Constitution Recommended by the Late Convention at Philadelphia. By Marcus., (Jan. 8,
1788), reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES IREDELL 359–60 (Donna Kelly & Lang
Baradell eds. 2003). Then, in 1798, while a Supreme Court Justice charged with interpreting and applying the Sedition Act, he was one of the strongest advocates for
ATING,
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Between these competing ideas, James Wilson clearly
articulated his view in the Pennsylvania ratification debate.
Beginning with the well-rehearsed line that a Bill of Rights was
unnecessary because “this Constitution says nothing with regard
to [the subject of the press], nor was it necessary because it will
be found that there is given to the general government no power
whatsoever concerning it; and no law, in pursuance of the
Constitution, can possibly be enacted to destroy that liberty.”88
Wilson goes on, however, to define the liberty of the press: “that
there should be no antecedent restraint upon it; but that every
author is responsible when he attacks the security or welfare of
the government, or the safety, character, and property of the
individual.”89 This seems to support an original intent that the
deprivation of power over the press, in the unamended original
Constitution, is only preventing power to institute prior
licensing. But then Wilson’s arguments reveal an ambiguity as to
when the author can be held responsible for his press attacks,
whether the power to punish common law crimes, such as
sedition and libel, can only be proscribed by a state where they
are published or if the federal government may possess such a
power.90
It is possible that there is an original intent and original
public meaning disagreement in this instance. This would mean
that the Federalists were arguing that the document limits only
extraordinary power over the press, such as instituting prior
restraints, but allows traditional governmental power over it,
such as passing sedition and libel laws. Meanwhile, the public
was hearing the Federalists’ promise that their new government
shall have no power to infringe the freedom of the press,
speaking, writing, and ultimately publishing whatsoever.91
Perhaps this view would leave such unenumerated traditional
state powers over speech and press to the states or as rights
retained by the people, given the inherent nature of American
federalism, later codified in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.92

the constitutionality of that piece of legislation. See BIRD, supra note 20, at 198–99
(2016) (Statement of James Iredell).
88
PENNSYLVANIA RATIFICATION CONVENTION DEBATES (Dec. 1, 1787) (statement of
James Wilson), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 444, 454–55 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1976).
89
Id. at 455.
90
Id. (recognizing a federalism inherent in libel prosecutions; that if a libel is prosecuted it must be tried in the state where it is committed).
91
See DEBATES, supra note 79, at 315.
92
THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (June 16, 1788) (Statement of George
Mason), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION
AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 441–42 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (arguing that
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Either way, practice under the new Constitution would come to
liquidate the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, Section 8
was seen as giving the government wide latitude in exercising
unenumerated powers by implication, at least in the context of
the National Bank, if not more broadly.93 This liquidation of the
scope of the federal government’s power has a latter effect on the
First Amendment’s meaning as applied to the Sedition Acts and
speech and press freedoms.94
All of this is to reiterate the main point of this Section:
that the power of the federal government to impinge on speech
and press freedoms before the adoption of the First Amendment
was ambiguous. The adoption of the First Amendment was
influenced by these two possible understandings of governmental
power over the liberty of the press. Particularly so if it was
designed to codify rights and protections already inherently
protected in the document,95 and even if it was designed to
supplementally protect specific legal concepts of speech and
press.96 Understanding this ambiguity illuminates the contested
meaning over how much federal power was granted in the
Constitution over the liberty of the press. Did Article I, Section
8 completely deprive Congress of power to pass any law
governing the press because no such power was enumerated and
was therefore reserved to the states? Or were the enumerated
powers merely limited from being construed to infringe the
concrete common law legal content of the “liberty of the press”?
The Sweeping Clause and the First Amendment
This view of federal power’s interaction with the freedom
of speech and press, prior to the adoption of the First
Amendment, depends significantly on the original meaning of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Also called the Sweeping
Clause by many in the Founding-Era, it reads “[t]he Congress
shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the

a reserved powers clause (like the future Tenth Amendment) would prevent a restrictive power over the press by implication from being exercised).
93
Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, supra note 16, at 19–22.
94
Campbell, First Amendment Federalism, supra note 2, at 4 (“The Republican account
of the First Amendment departed substantially from prevailing ideas about speech
and press freedoms.”).
95
Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 300 (“Federalist denials of authority to
abridge the liberty of the press relied on the lack of any enumerated power that
would justify a licensing regime.”).
96
Id. at 299 (“[M]any [Federalists] explained that bills of rights were merely declaratory of pre-existing rights and were therefore legally unnecessary.”).
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Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”97 All of the Framers acknowledged that this and
Article I, Section 8, Clause 198 were not unlimited grants of
power—indeed, there were powers that were clearly not within
the grant of power to the federal government.99 Several legal
scholars have written about the original meaning of the
Sweeping Clause, and many have found that the power over the
press was outside the bounds of the powers therein granted to
Congress and the federal government.100
Thus, this Article’s argument builds upon Campbell’s
work on the original meaning of the First Amendment, which
might allow for more restrictions on speech and press in the
interest of the public good than current law does.101 It also
suggests that the federalism-based Jeffersonian interpretation of
the First Amendment is not a mere “invention” of the 1790s,
which would make it incompatible with the original meaning of
the Amendment.102 This Article suggests that the Jeffersonian
viewpoint might have an intellectual link to the viewpoints of
many Anti-Federalists who participated in the Constitution’s
ratification, and a link to a literalist interpretation of Federalist

97

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Id. § 8, cl. 1. (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States”); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 464 (1833) (“In this sense, congress has not
an unlimited power of taxation; but it is limited to specific objects,—the payment of
the public debts, and providing for the common defence and general welfare. A tax,
therefore, laid by congress for neither of these objects, would be unconstitutional, as
an excess of its legislative authority.”).
99
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a Bank, reprinted in 8 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 103, 103 (Harold C. Syrett & James E. Cooke
eds., 1965) (“It may be truly said of every government, as well as of that of the
United States, that it has only a right, to pass such laws as are necessary [and] proper
to accomplish the objects intrusted to it. For no government has a right to do merely
what it pleases.”) (emphasis in original).
100
See generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L. J. 267, 319
(1993); see also Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183–221 (2003); William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent
Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1822 (2013) (“Perhaps the First Amendment is
merely a confirmation of the broader, structural principle that Congress lacks any implied authority to regulate the press, because regulation of the press is a great power.
Under a great powers theory, Congress might still be able to restrict the press when
regulating under its expressly enumerated powers.”).
101
See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 6, at 263–64; see also Sunstein, supra note
6.
102
See generally Campbell, First Amendment Federalism, supra note 2 (arguing that the
Jeffersonian opposition to the Sedition Act was based on a novel interpretation of the
First Amendment, not principally as a rights provision, but as a federalism rule).
98
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ratification arguments, giving it a foothold in the original
meaning and opening the door to liquidation post-ratification.103
The
“core
axiom”
of
Thomas
Jefferson’s
constitutionalism was that the purpose of a constitution, in fact
its very reason for existence, was “to limit government and the
power that might endanger liberty.”104 This “core principle” put
Jefferson philosophically in the Anti-Federalist camp that sought
to protect liberty and strengthen states with the addition of a Bill
of Rights.105 The Jeffersonian conception of the First
Amendment springs from that interpretation of the
Constitution’s meaning.106 The original law, therefore, may still
provide for more robust speech and press protections as
originally understood, not through the First Amendment
standing alone, but through an original understanding of
governmental power in Article I, Section 8 and in the nature of
American government in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Alternatively, but interconnectedly, greater protection for speech
and press is afforded in the original law through the theory of
liquidation operating on the Sweeping Clause and on the
federalism-based Jeffersonian interpretation of the First
Amendment.
The Original Meaning of the Sweeping Clause
The question becomes: what power does the federal
government have over the freedom of speech and press? There is
no enumerated power given to the federal government over
either. If a federal power exists at all to enact something like the
Sedition Act, it is contained in the Sweeping Clause. Two
principal perspectives then arise: first, the Sweeping Clause gives
the federal government implied incidental powers over speech
and press only limited by limitations on power inherent in the
Constitution and by the definitive legal content of the First
Amendment. Second, such power is altogether outside the
bounds of federal power by virtue of the limited grant of power
and the structure of the Constitution rather than by the specific
textual meaning of the First Amendment alone. The answer to
this ambiguity hinges on the original meaning of the Sweeping
Clause.

103

See id. (arguing that the Jeffersonian opposition to the Sedition Act was based on a
novel interpretation of the First Amendment, not principally as a rights provision,
but as a federalism rule).
104
David T. Konig, Thomas Jefferson’s Armed Citizenry and the Republican Militia, 1
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 250, 268 (2008).
105
Id.
106
Id.
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1. Necessary
The Sweeping Clause reads: “The Congress shall have
Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
to carry into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”107 The
famous exposition of this clause’s meaning is given by Chief
Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland;108 however, this
case has generally been misunderstood by the courts as proving
too much.109 Marshall himself explained his position as standing
for a less high-toned view than many have since made it out to
be.110 He makes this point in a pseudonymously published essay
explaining and defending his opinion in McCulloch.111 Marshall
defended his opinion by arguing that his definition of
“necessary,” meaning “convenient, or useful, or essential to
another,”112 did not extend the powers of Congress by
implication beyond the Constitution, but, to the contrary, “[t]he
whole opinion of the court proceeds upon this basis, as on a truth
not to be controverted. The principle it labors to establish is not
that congress may select means beyond the limits of the
constitution, but means within those limits.”113 Marshall
recognized limits to the Sweeping Clause’s allowances and
recognized that the Court would police the discretion exercised
by Congress in the use of its power.114
There was another, stricter meaning of the Sweeping
Clause, advanced by Jefferson, Madison, and Randolph,115 that
powers implied through it must “be limited to means necessary
to the end, and incident to the nature of the specified powers.”116
If there was no limit on what powers could be implied through

107

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
17 U.S. 316, 413–14 (1819) (“To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as
being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable.”); see also HAMILTON, supra note 99, at 102–03.
109
17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the
sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried
into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it,
in the manner most beneficial to the people.”). See also Barnett, supra note 100, at
199–200.
110
See John Marshall, Essays from the “Alexandria Gazette”: John Marshall, “A Friend of
the Constitution”, 21 STAN. L. REV. 456–99 (1969).
111
Id.
112
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413–14.
113
Marshall, supra note 110, at 477.
114
Barnett, supra note 100, at 215.
115
Id. at 188–96.
116
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947 (1791).
108
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the Sweeping Clause’s connection with an enumerated power,
then “[t]he essential characteristics of the Government, as
composed of limited and enumerated powers, would be
destroyed[,]”117 and further, “[i]f implications, thus remote and
thus multiplied, can be linked together, a chain may be formed
that will reach every object of legislation, every object within the
whole compass of political economy.”118 No matter what
interpretive track one takes on the meaning of the clause, it is
true that “[w]hatever meaning this clause may have, none can be
admitted, that would give an unlimited discretion to
Congress.”119
It is likely that the Sweeping Clause’s original meaning is
somewhere in between the strong reading of the language in
McCulloch and the position asserted by Jefferson, Madison, and
Randolph.120 Its meaning is principally contained within its two
central words: “necessary” and “proper.”121 Everyone at the time
and to this day recognized that the word “necessary” requires a
means-ends fit.122 The decision between “convenience” and
“absolute necessity,” however, was and is a false dichotomy.123
Madison and Hamilton, on different sides of the debate, both
espoused a similar interpretation of the Sweeping Clause’s
meaning that has been lost in a strong interpretation of
McCulloch’s language.124 Madison stated that the clause’s words
should be “understood so as to permit the adoption of measures
the best calculated to attain the ends of government, and produce
the greatest quantum of public utility.”125 Hamilton, in his
opinion on the National Bank, argued that “[t]he relation
between the measure and the end; between the nature of the
mean employed towards the execution of a power, and the object
of that power; must be the criterion of constitutionality; not the
more or less of necessity or utility.”126 Under this view of
“necessary,” some powers can be implied and some cannot. The
test is a middle ground between so strict a means-ends fit that no
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Id. at 1947.
Id. at 1949.
119
Id. at 1947.
120
Barnett, supra note 100, at 206–07 (“All parties to the first bank debate agreed that
absolute necessity was not required, but at the same time all agreed that some degree
of means-end fit was needed. . . . In modern terms, a showing of necessity should
neither be so "strict" that no statute can pass muster . . . .”).
121
Id. at 206.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 215.
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statute can be upheld and so loose a fit that any statute can be
affirmed.127
2. Proper
The other key word in the clause, “proper,” has gotten
less attention and may have received its first real treatment by
the Supreme Court only recently in the opinion of Chief Justice
Roberts in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.128
As persuasively argued by Randy Barnett, Gary Lawson, and
others, “proper” has an independent and important meaning
distinct from “necessary.”129 According to Lawson:
The Sweeping Clause requires valid
executory laws to be “proper.” If
the word “proper” in that clause has
a jurisdictional meaning, then the
authority conferred by executory
laws must distinctively and
peculiarly belong to the national
government as a whole and to the
particular
national
institution
whose powers are carried into
execution.
The argument then hones in on three properties of the word
“proper” in the original meaning of the Sweeping Clause:
In view of the limited character of
the national government under the
Constitution, Congress’s choice of
means to execute federal powers
would be constrained in at least
three ways: first, an executory law
would have to conform to the
“proper” allocation of authority
within the federal government;
second, such a law would have to be
within the “proper” scope of the
federal
government’s
limited
jurisdiction with respect to the
retained prerogatives of the states;
and third, the law would have to be
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within the “proper” scope of the
federal
government’s
limited
jurisdiction with respect to the
people’s retained rights. In other
words, under a jurisdictional
construction of the Sweeping
Clause, executory laws must be
consistent with principles of
separation of powers, principles of
federalism, and individual rights.130
This understanding of the Sweeping Clause is known as the
jurisdictional interpretation.131 Barnett has formulated a threepart understanding of what is required by the word “proper”
under this approach.132 He writes that “for a law to be ‘proper’ it
must not only be necessary, it must also be within the jurisdiction
of Congress.”133 He goes on: “[t]his propriety of jurisdiction is
determined in at least three ways: (1) according to principles of
separation of powers, (2) according to principles of federalism,
and (3) according to the background rights retained by the
people.”134 Further, he emphasizes the third requirement of
“proper,” which is important in the First Amendment natural
rights context, saying “[g]iven the importance of natural rights to
constitutional legitimacy in the absence of unanimous consent,
let me focus on the third element: laws are improper when they
violate the background rights retained by the people.”135 Chief
Justice Roberts appears to track a form of this understanding of
“proper” in his opinion in Sebelius, stating that “we have also
carried out our responsibility to declare unconstitutional those
laws that undermine the structure of government established by
the Constitution. Such laws, which are not ‘consist[ent] with the
letter and spirit of the constitution,’ are not ‘proper [means] for
carrying into Execution’ Congress’s enumerated powers.”136 The
Chief Justice recognized that the propriety requirement of the
Sweeping Clause ensures that Congress stays within its
jurisdiction when exercising power by implication and does not
violate the “structure of government,” which is limited by
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principles of separation of powers, federalism, and also by
individual rights.137
Given this original understanding of the scope of the
Sweeping Clause predating the First Amendment, the power of
the federal government to regulate speech and press is at best
uncertain, and many have argued such regulation is outside the
bounds of implied federal power altogether.138 William Baude
has articulated this interpretation of federal powers and Article
I, Section 8 as “a great powers theory.”139 Even before the
ratification of the First Amendment, it is wholly possible that
regulations of speech and press—independent of a tight fitting
connection between means employed to attain the ends of an
enumerated power—was an unconstitutional exercise of federal
legislative power.140 This parallels the Federalist argument that a
Bill of Rights was unnecessary because no power existed over
any of those rights.141 It may also explain why Campbell’s
argument for the meaning and definitive legal content of the First
Amendment protects such a limited sphere of individual rights,
by modern standards, and leaves so great a realm of discretion to
Congress on how they will regulate speech and press, natural and
positive rights, in the interest of the public good.142
3. Federalism Considered
Federalism is also relevant to this analysis. The Tenth
Amendment underscores the foundational principle of
federalism in the American constitutional system and forms a
component of the superstructure of the Constitution that protects
speech and press more broadly under an originalist interpretation
of all the Constitution’s parts than does the original meaning of
the First Amendment standing alone. Constitutional structure
protects liberty. State provisions identical to the First
Amendment can operate within the structure of state
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constitutions differently than the First Amendment does within
the federal Constitution’s structure. This is not because there is a
difference in the legal content of the rights provisions, but
because a different conception of governmental power existed at
the federal and state levels.143 As Madison observed in Federalist
No. 45:
The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous
and indefinite. The former will be
exercised principally on external
objects, as war, peace, negotiation,
and foreign commerce; with which
last the power of taxation will, for
the most part, be connected. The
powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and
the internal order, improvement,
and prosperity of the State.144
Against the constitutional background of social contract
theory, natural rights philosophy, separation of powers,
federalism, and limited government powers, it could be improper
for Congress to pass laws that infringed not only on the
inalienable natural right of freedom of opinion but on all natural
rights to speak, write, and publish, which are arguably retained
by the people through the Ninth Amendment’s rule of
construction.145 Perhaps these non-inalienable natural rights are
protected not only implicitly in Article I, Section 8 but also
explicitly under the Ninth Amendment’s rule of construction
applied to federal powers and the First Amendment.146
This is not just an argument about federal power,
however. It is also important that the nature of state governments
is different from that of the federal government.147 Campbell
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argues that there is no evidence that the First Amendment
operated on the powers of the federal government any differently
than its state counterparts operated on state powers.148 This
statement does not properly situate speech and press protecting
provisions against the inherent differences between the powers
of the federal and state governments. As Lawson notes, a state
government “is a general government, possessing all legislative
powers not specifically restricted by its constitution, whereas the
national government is limited to its constitutionally enumerated
powers.”149 This is a crucial difference. A state level speech and
press clause is designed as a carve out of state general power,150
whereas the First Amendment recognizes a limitation that
Federalists already argued was inherent in the limited powers of
Congress.151 The Federalists were expressly enumerating rights
to placate the fears of Anti-Federalists, who still in many respects
opposed the Constitution, especially so long as a Bill of Rights
was absent from it.152
Therefore, it is possible that identical rights protecting or
rights recognizing provisions could operate differently at the
federal and state level. This is supported by the inherent
limitations on federal power in the enumeration of Article I,
Section 8, and the later addition of the First, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments. The rule of construction in the Ninth Amendment
is an additional recognition of this fact.153 Even if the First
Amendment protects only the limited and defined legal content,
which Campbell ably demonstrates and the historical record
shows that it does, the Ninth Amendment explains that the
enumeration of powers in Article I, Section 8, culminating in the
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Sweeping Clause is not to be construed to “deny or disparage
others retained by the people.”154 Against the constitutional
background of natural rights philosophy and the Federalist
insistence that the powers of the federal government could not be
legally expanded to regulate the press, the Ninth Amendment
might contain protections for the natural rights of speaking,
writing, and publishing that were recognized by all as inherent
natural rights and that many state constitutions expressly
recognized as protected rights.155 Thus, the limited protection
afforded by Campbell’s recovered original meaning of the First
Amendment is actually much broader when one situates it in the
full structure of the Constitution—its limited grant of power,
further separation of those powers, additional safeguard of
federalism, and its rights favoring rule of construction expressed
in the Ninth Amendment. The structure of the Framer’s
Constitution protects liberty over and above the protections of its
individual parts.
III. LIQUIDATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S MEANING
Liquidation Theory
The concept of liquidation, the fixing of ambiguous or opentextured constitutional meaning through historical practices,156
was a commonplace theory in the Founding-Era.157 It has been
the subject of significant attention recently in legal academia and
it has sparked some significant debates158 while being the subject
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of deeper exploration in legal scholarship.159 Following the
recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Noel
Canning,160 which invoked the constitutional concept of
liquidation for the first time in the Court’s recent history,161 it
remains to be seen how the modern court may invoke the theory
to solve future cases and controversies in constitutional law.162
This Article’s contribution to the scholarly enterprise
reveals how the theory of liquidation has been applied to the First
Amendment. The theory of liquidation as applied to the difficult
question of discovering the First Amendment’s original meaning
and understanding the Court’s modern First Amendment
jurisprudence may provide clarity to an otherwise ambiguous
subject and partially describe what has actually happened in the
Supreme Court’s seminal free speech and press cases—
connecting current doctrine to the First Amendment’s original
meanings to show that our First Amendment law is originalist.
The work of Professor Campbell has provided an intellectual
pathway into the Founding-Era conception of First Amendment
rights.163 His view of the Amendment’s meaning, however, was
quickly dispensed with in the aftermath of the debates over the
Sedition Act of 1798, when the federalism-based Jeffersonian
interpretation of the First Amendment’s meaning became the
dominant view.164 These 1790’s historical practices open a door
to understanding how the Founding-Era views on the First
Amendment’s legal meaning were settled, clarified, or fixed—
liquidated—and how disagreements about the scope or
application of that meaning have been and can be resolved
through a course of historical practices.165 Thus, it is arguable
159
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that the Jeffersonian interpretation of the First Amendment,
extrapolated from original meanings and Anti-Federalist original
intent, became the law consistent with the original law or the
Founders’ law.166
The part of the Founders’ law that makes this arguably
possible is the original method of liquidation. Liquidation is a
theory for how historical practices can “settle” or “clarify” the
meaning of an otherwise ambiguous constitutional provision.167
The word is derived from the Latin word “liquidus,” which can
have the meaning “clear” or “evident.”168 To liquidate
constitutional meaning in this context means clarifying or
making clear, “to render unambiguous; to settle.”169
The primary proponent of the constitutional theory of
liquidation was James Madison, who developed the theory170
and employed it throughout his life.171 It was central to the way
he thought about the Constitution.172 One of his earliest
references to liquidation theory emerged in Federalist No. 37.
Commenting on the difficulty of writing laws, he wrote that even
laws “penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the
fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and
ascertained by a series of particular discussions and
adjudications.”173 Madison’s explanations of liquidation are
scattered among his papers, mostly letters, and though he does
not give us a scholarly exposition of exactly what he meant by
the idea, three concepts emerge as essential to a Madisonian
theory of liquidation.174

ideas on liberty and power that were expressed in the Ratification Conventions by an
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The three features of liquidation are, as Will Baude
explains, “an indeterminacy, a course of deliberate practice, and
settlement.”175 Indeterminacy occurs in cases of “doubtful or
contested meanings” and comes in two primary flavors:
vagueness and ambiguity.176 Not everything in the Constitution
is indeterminate. A constitutional provision must be
indeterminate to be open for liquidation—indeterminacy is a
barrier to entry for liquidation.177 This requirement means that
not every clause is up for grabs for liquidation purposes.178
A course of practice takes on the form of a kind of
precedent, not merely judicial but legislative, and it could
potentially be a series of similar actions taken by the branches of
the federal government, the states, and the public at large that
settles a particular meaning of a constitutional provision from a
range of plausible meanings.179 The course of practice had to be
deliberative—a deliberate exposition on meaning—the
successive acts had to amount to a showing of acquiescence, and
the course of practice had to “happen repeatedly and
consistently.”180 The course of practice could also not be sheer
political will or expediency, it had to be a deliberate debate and
a series of actions taken on the basis of a constitutional
interpretation.181
Lastly, there must be settlement to render liquidation
complete.182 As Baude phrased it, “the course of deliberate
practice had to stick.”183 The settlement required that the
meaning established through a course of practice had to have
some force independent and greater than individual actors.184 It
required acquiescence, or agreement, between opposing parties
or institutions, and public sanction, approval by the people, that
this course of practice was applying the appropriate meaning.185
In other words:
[T]he people’s role as the ultimate
source of binding constitutional
norms made them the ultimate
source of constructing its meaning
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as well. (Though, to be sure, this
expression of popular sovereignty
was presumably lesser in stature
than the formal enactment of
constitutional text, which is why it
could “expound” but not “alter.”)186
By this process of liquidation that has existed since the
Founding, historical practices can fill the gap in indeterminate
meaning and provide a more specific meaning out of a previous
constitutional indeterminacy.187
Through the original method of liquidation, the meaning
of governmental power and individual liberty were, in a sense,
inversed. Reflecting on having lost the debate over the meaning
of the Sweeping Clause in the debate over the constitutionality
of a National Bank in the early 1790s,188 Jefferson and Madison
had to look beyond limits imposed by enumerated powers to
oppose the constitutionality of the Sedition Acts in the late
1790s.189 They turned to a tool that was not in the Constitution
during the first debates: the Bill of Rights, specifically the First
Amendment.190 As the original meaning of the Sweeping Clause
was liquidated with a vastly more expansive scope than
originally intended, the First Amendment was liquidated as
having a larger protective force, internally and of its own force,
than originally intended.191 The result? The federal government
was deprived of a power that it had not possessed under the
original meaning of Article I, Section 8 but that it had acquired
through a liquidated meaning of the Sweeping Clause, best
expressed in a strong reading of McCulloch v. Maryland.192 The
federal government was thereafter deprived of the ability to
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exercise power over speech and press rights not by implied limits
on power generally but by the made-powerful enumeration of
federalism rights in the liquidated Jeffersonian construction of
the First Amendment.
Indeterminacy: The Sedition Act of 1798, The First Amendment and
Government Power
The first major challenge to speech and press freedoms
and the meaning of the First Amendment arose in the Federalist
passage of the Sedition Act in 1798 and the Republican
opposition to it.193 The following section will recount this history
through the lens of liquidation and explain how the original
meaning of the First Amendment was liquidated as the
federalism-based Jeffersonian interpretation that Professor
Campbell describes as an “invention.”194
The indeterminacy of how much protection was afforded
speech and press freedoms in the original constitution is already
established in the discussion above.195 There were at least two
distinct views of the meaning of the First Amendment at its
adoption. The “majority view,” that the available evidence
shows to be the most legally sound claim to the First
Amendment’s original meaning at the time of its adoption. This
is the view expressed by Professor Campbell.196 The second is the
“dissenting view”: this is the view developed or “invented” by
Madison and the Jeffersonian Republicans but it has its roots in
Federalist and Anti-Federalist ratification arguments197 over the
need for a Bill of Rights198 and if the First Amendment was a
mere codification of those arguments or not.199 That view is that
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the new government established by the Constitution had no
power over speech and press whatsoever because it was
unenumerated and out of the scope of the original meaning of
the Necessary and Proper clause.200 Further indeterminacy arises
when putting all of these moving parts—the First Amendment
liberties, the Sweeping Clause and limited governmental powers,
and the Ninth and Tenth Amendment rules of construction
favoring retained rights and reserved powers—together in an as
applied challenge mounted by the Jeffersonian Republicans
against the Sedition Act of 1798.
Course of Practice
The Sedition Act was passed into law on July 14th, 1798,
and provided a constitutional challenge and an opportunity for
liquidation to occur.201 The immediate controversy and
opposition that surrounded its consideration and passage, 202
based primarily on constitutional grounds, was a testament to the
indeterminacy of the power of the federal government over
prosecutions of speech and press as well as the meaning of the
First Amendment in relation to the exercise of that power.203 The
debate that surrounded the Sedition Act sharpened and polarized
the opposing viewpoints.204 The Federalists took a BlackstoneMansfield view on governmental power over speech, press, and
common law crimes.205 The Republicans took a federalism
approach to speech and press freedoms—that the federal
government had no power over these liberties, and that there
were no federal common law crimes aside from those listed in
the Constitution. They argued further that any such laws and

(“The First Amendment did not change the meaning of these rights [freedom of
speech and press] that confined legislative power; rather, the American innovation
was to enumerate them.”) (emphases in original).
200
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prosecutions had to take place at the state level.206 As has been
shown above, both of these views had intellectual lineage to the
Constitution’s ratification and the resultant dueling meanings of
liberty and power were primed for a liquidation in the event of a
challenge or crisis, which the Sedition Act provided.
Baude’s piece on constitutional liquidation provides a
framework for thinking about how a meaning of a constitutional
provision is liquidated. He presents the debate over the
constitutionality of the national bank as a paradigm case of
constitutional liquidation. That debate primarily involved an
interpretation of the Sweeping Clause.207 The events surrounding
that episode in American constitutional history include striking
parallels to those surrounding the Sedition Act crisis and provide
an analogical roadmap to show how the meaning of the First
Amendment was liquidated.208 It is also interesting to note that
the liquidated meaning of governmental power in relation to the
constitutionality of chartering a national bank may account for
why much of the Republican constitutional opposition to the
Sedition Act hinged on the First Amendment, despite the
majority original public understanding explained by Campbell,
rather than on an interpretation of Article I, Section 8.209
The course of practice that liquidated the Jeffersonian
position on the First Amendment begins, not in the Sedition Act
controversy itself, but with the Election of 1800.210 This first
practice is analogous to the passage of the bill to charter a
national bank over fierce opposition that was a first practice in
what would become an established course for liquidating the
meaning of the Sweeping Clause to justify the exercise of that
power.211 The Sedition Act controversy, however, was important
in giving Jeffersonians an event to express their view of the
meaning of the First Amendment, which would begin to be
liquidated by Jefferson’s election. The Election of 1800 that
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swept Republicans into two-thirds of the federal government, the
Congress and the Presidency, was an initial vindication by the
people of their view of the First Amendment as depriving the
federal government of any power to regulate speech and press.212
The next event in the course of practice that leads to
liquidation is President Jefferson’s actions after taking office. He
ended all prosecutions under the Sedition Act and pardoned all
persons convicted under it.213 This was analogous to President
Washington signing into law the bill chartering a national bank
over the opposition opinions of Secretary of State, Thomas
Jefferson, and Attorney General, Edmund Randolph.214 Both
actions amounted to Presidential approval of a particular view of
constitutional meaning following a thoughtful deliberation on
the matter. It is at this point that the Republican view of the First
Amendment may have been liquidated, especially given the fact
that it was not challenged in subsequent years.215 Indeed,
Madison, as President in 1815, several years before the Supreme
Court decided McCulloch v. Maryland, had already found the
constitutional question of the national bank’s constitutionality to
be a settled question. This was primarily due to the public
acceptance following its signing into law by President
Washington.216
The continued elections of Republicans, especially the
back to back Jeffersonian protégés,217 coupled with the lack of
significant challenges to speech and press freedoms until at least
the Civil War, displays additional acquiesce by the majority to
the Jeffersonian interpretation of the First Amendment.218 The
Madison Presidency is of particular interest to this analysis of
historical practices, not just because he was the leading
intellectual proponent of constitutional liquidation, but because
it is generally agreed that one of his greatest achievements as
president was that his administration did not infringe civil
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liberties during war times.219 Madison was faced with an even
greater military crisis and existential threat to the republic than
the Federalists had been in 1798. The War of 1812 was no quasiwar with Britain, it was a full-scale military engagement on
American soil. Despite all the noted hardships of that war,
Madison never suppressed speech or press rights, though there
was a great deal of both speech and press that were critical of
“Mr. Madison’s War.”220 In so doing, the Federalists did not
succeed in making a triumphant return to the political scene to
vindicate their view that legislation, like the Sedition Act, was
needed during war times.221 Instead, the party that had passed
the Sedition Act as a war measure was extinguished in the wake
of the War of 1812, never to return.222
It is this course of practice, the Republican opposition to
the Sedition Act, that led to the Jeffersonian ascendance to the
Presidency and to Republican control of Congress, as well as the
ultimate decline and fall of the Federalist Party that liquidated
the federalism-based Jeffersonian interpretation of the First
Amendment. The events in this “Revolution of 1800”—relating
to, federalism, civil liberties, and the freedom of speech, and of
the press are the events that ultimately liquidated the
Jeffersonian interpretation of the First Amendment. An
interpretation that had its roots, not simply in the creation of the
First Amendment, but in the ratification arguments over a lack
of federal government power over the liberties of speech and
press and in the Antifederalists’ understanding of the purpose of
a Constitution and Bill of Rights.223
Settlement
For settlement to occur, the course of practice must
224
stick. The practices have to reach a “uniformity” and acquire
“some kind of cumulative force that transcended one’s own
personal interpretation.”225 The two elements of settlement are
acquiescence and public sanction. Acquiescence means that “the
losers in some sense gave up.”226 The legislature and executive
219
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both became Republican, the Federalist Party never achieved
national power again and would die out in short order. All the
branches of government, even the courts, acquiesced.227 The
public sanction was not only displayed in the Election of 1800
and continued electoral dominance by the Republicans, but in
the overarching trend toward public acceptance of a view of
freedom of speech and press that is decidedly broader than
Blackstone’s traditional common law view.228 The Jeffersonian
interpretation of speech and press had both acquiescence and
public sanction. Perhaps the strongest indication that the
Jeffersonian view of the First Amendment was liquidated
actually comes in one of the most famous First Amendment
cases of all time, in which, paradoxically, the Jeffersonian view
is simultaneously recognized and changed. 229 That case is New
York Times v. Sullivan.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court spends a great
deal of time discussing the public controversy over the Sedition
Act of 1798, recognizing that it “first crystallized a national
awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.”230
This language of crystallization is synonymous with Madison’s
description of the meaning of liquidation.231 The Court goes on
to say that “[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never tested in this
Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court
of history.”232 Again, this reference to “the court of history”
seems to indicate an understanding that historical practices had
crystallized the central meaning of the First Amendment.233 In
other words, a course of practices had liquidated the meaning of
the First Amendment. The Court also recognized the broad
consensus of public opinion and the acquiescence of the
institutions of government to the Republican position on the
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Sedition Act—an essential component of liquidation or
crystallization.234
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, to fully understand the Constitution’s
relationship to the “freedom of speech, or of the press,”235 one
must understand the original meaning of several different
provisions of the Constitution. First, the Sweeping Clause and
governmental power over speech and press in Article I, Section
8. Second, the First Amendment itself and its definitive legal
content as originally understood. In the background of all of this
is the federal common law or general law over speech and press
as originally understood, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, as
well as Founding-Era original methods, such as liquidation.
These sources of law are distinct and independent of one
another while still interacting. The original meaning of the
Sweeping Clause is between the strong reading of McCulloch and
the Jeffersonian position, something along the lines of Marshall’s
own view of what McCulloch stood for.236 It was, and has come
to be, liquidated as a much stronger version of McCulloch than
Marshall himself seems to have intended.237 The original
meaning of the First Amendment is best expressed in the work
of Professor Campbell and has definitive legal content. Under
that approach, the First Amendment enumerates the natural
rights of speaking, writing, and publishing, all capable of being
restricted in the interest of the public good. Except the
inalienable freedom to express one’s honest opinion and the
common law positive right to the liberty of the press as best
expressed by Blackstone, including the Zenger defense of truth,
which cannot be restricted at all.238
Liberty and power interact in this context. The natural
rights enumerated in the First Amendment could only be
regulated according to the enumerated powers in Article I,
Section 8, including authorized implied powers, and as such
there is an ambiguity as to whether speech and press can be
regulated at all at the federal level and if so, how much? This
ambiguity comes into play in what is meant when one says there
is no danger posed to the press by the Constitution because there
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is no enumerated power over the press. Does this mean that the
federal government has no power over the press at all or no
power to infringe the common law liberty of the press?
At the very least, this ambiguity of governmental power
over speech and press creates an indeterminacy that sets the stage
for a liquidation of the meaning of that power and those
liberties.239 The liquidation of the Sweeping Clause at its most
broad reading and the loss of the Jeffersonian position as relates
to that power in the debates over the constitutionality of the
national bank led the Jeffersonians to oppose the Sedition Act’s
constitutionality not from the perspective of power but from the
perspective of federalism and liberty.240 In so doing, the
Jeffersonian view of the First Amendment, that the federal
government is categorically deprived of all power over speech
and press, is liquidated as the First Amendment’s meaning. That
meaning is not disturbed until at least the Civil War and
Reconstruction adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. At any
rate, the liquidated federalism-based Jeffersonian interpretation
continues to be foundational to the modern courts understanding
of the First Amendment, beginning with New York Times v.
Sullivan and animating its jurisprudence right up to the present
day.241
Although New York Times v. Sullivan recognized the
liquidation that occurred during the Sedition Act controversy, it
simultaneously changed the requirements of the First
Amendment from the Jeffersonian federalism rule to the actual
malice standard of modern First Amendment law.242 Some
Originalists, most notably Justice Thomas and the late Justice
Scalia, have questioned whether this actual malice standard can
possibly be the correct original understanding of the First
Amendment.243
Justice Thomas’s recent concurrence in McKee v. Cosby
questions the rightness of New York Times v. Sullivan. Throughout
the concurrence—in similar tones to the Campbell-Federalist
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view—Justice Thomas touches on the founding-era common
law of defamation and libel.244 At other times, he takes a
federalism approach that resembles the Jeffersonian view stating
that the States may be the proper venues for “striking an
acceptable balance between encouraging robust public discourse
and providing a meaningful remedy for reputational harm.”245
Thomas’s concurrence could provide a method of restoring a
more originalist rule to First Amendment law—relying heavily
on the positive law rules of the common law and leaving the
regulation of these issues to the states. In both his common law
history and reliance on federalism, Justice Thomas’s
concurrence is tapping into the currents of the original
understanding of the First Amendment.
This Article does not take a firm stand on the correct
originalist interpretation of the First Amendment’s speech and
press protections. 246 It only states that the “official story” of our
First Amendment law is originalist in important respects and
embraces, rather than rejects, a form of originalism.247 Leaving
the door open to getting the original meaning of the First
Amendment right if the current understanding is incorrect as a
matter of original law.
This Article does not purport to be the final word on the
meaning of the First Amendment, many arguments can be made
about what speech and press freedoms consist of and how the
law protects them. This Article does, however, demonstrate that
our modern doctrine has an originalist pedigree. Whether the
moves made are all legally valid originalist moves is for a
different article to examine. The fact is that these moves were
made and, in some important ways, they are originalist moves.
This means that in some sense our First Amendment law is
originalist even if “the freedom of speech, and of the press”248
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means not exactly the same thing in 1788,249 1791,250 1800,251 and
1964.252 Which of these points in time, if any or all, encapsulates
an accurate original meaning of the First Amendment depends
on one’s theory of originalism, but the point is that originalism
is, in an important way, our First Amendment law.253
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